# Security Affairs of Islamicjerusalem (Bayt al-Maqdis) after the First Muslim Conquest (637CE): A Historical and Analytical Study

*Abstract*

For a long time Islamicjerusalem which is also known as Bayt al-Maqdis has seem to be a vulnerable region attracting attention from various parties. With the coming of the Muslims to liberate Islamicjerusalem in 637CE, the situation inside and outside the territory seems to have experienced various kinds approach. The Muslims employed their concept of sovereignty over the territory, which emphasised on the security issues. In this paper, the researcher endeavours to examine the issues of safety and relevant matters in relation to territorial security as significant elements in implementing the Muslim concept of sovereignty over Islamicjerusalem. Some of the questions needed to be addressed here: Did they successfully implement that concept? What kind of security measures were taken by Muslim sovereigns to secure Islamicjerusalem? What role did the non-Muslims play their roles in securing the region? The researcher attempts to employ multi-disciplinary research methodologies in conducting this research. While, historical research methodology is widely used to investigate significant historical facts and records, Islamic research methodology will also be employed to provide a basis of Muslim understandings towards an element of concept of sovereignty, namely, 'security'.


*Keywords*: Security, Sovereignty, Islamicjerusalem region.

**Introduction**

For a long time Islamicjerusalem which is also known as Bayt al-Maqdis has seem to be a vulnerable region attracting attention from various parties. With the coming of the Muslims to liberate Islamicjerusalem, the situation inside and outside the territory seems to have experienced various kinds approach. The Muslims employed their concept of sovereignty over the territory, which emphasised on the security and taxation issues. The questions needed to be addressed here: Did they successfully implement that concept? What kind of security measures were taken by Muslim sovereigns to secure Islamicjerusalem? What role did the non-Muslims play their roles in securing the region? The researcher attempts to employ multi-disciplinary research methodologies in conducting this research. While, historical research methodology is widely used to investigate significant historical facts and records, Islamic research methodology will also be employed to provide a basis of Muslim understandings towards an element of concept of sovereignty, namely, 'security'.

**Territorial Security**

The researcher argues that Muslim sovereigns in Islamicjerusalem emphasized the importance of security affairs as being among their top priorities. As the region came under Muslim sovereignty, the Muslims were fully responsible for the security of the land. Hence, it seems crucial to examine the measures and steps they taken to ensure territorial security in order that all individuals could live in peace and safety in Muslim territory.

The Muslim sovereign's strong commitment towards ensuring safety has been clearly proven since the first Muslim conquest of Islamicjerusalem when ᶜUmar (13-23 AH/ 634-644 CE) granted an assurance of safety to the people of the region.

> 'In the name of Allāh, the most Merciful, the most Compassionate. This is the assurance of safety *(Amān)* which the servant of Allāh (the second Caliph) ᶜUmar (Ibn al-Khattāb), the Commander of the Faithful, has granted to the people of Aelia. He has granted them an assurance of safety *(Amān)* for their lives and possessions, their churches and crosses; the sick and the healthy (to every one without exceptions), and for the rest of its religious community…' (al-Tabarī 1997: (2) 449, El-ᶜAwaisī 2005: 72)

It seems to the researcher that the ᶜUmar Assurance of safety has shown how deep was the Muslim sovereign's concern for the issues of security of Islamicjerusalem. The researcher argues that this great concern affirms the significance of security matters in implementing the Muslim concept of sovereignty over the territory. The researcher tends to agree with El-ᶜAwaisī (2005: 76) that protection, safety and security, which could be summed up with the word *'Amān,'* have been highlighted as the main themes for that significant Assurance. It has also been strongly emphasised from the beginning and throughout the document. El-ᶜAwaisī (2005: 76) notes that, 'The word safety and its derivatives occur eight times, *Amān* (three times), safeguarded (three times) and place of safety (twice) in the text.' Hence, this prompts the researcher to argue that the Muslim sovereign came to save and secure the people of the liberated territory of Islamicjerusalem. Implicitly, ᶜUmar successfully demonstrated the real intention behind obtaining sovereignty over the region, which had been inspired from Prophet Muhammad's lifetime.[1]

Significantly, the Muslim concept of sovereignty over the territory was not only implemented towards securing the local people, who showed allegiance to the

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[1] ᶜAbdallāh Omar Maᶜrouf, a young scholar in Islamicjerusalem Studies, has produced an outstanding research for his M.Litt. degree in Islamicjerusalem Studies regarding the three main practical steps of Prophet Muhammad towards the Conquest of Islamicjerusalem.

sovereign, but also applied towards ensuring safety for those who chose to live under the opponents of Muslim sovereign[2] on their way over the border, of the Muslim territory. '… Those of people of Aelia who would like to leave with the Byzantines, take their possessions, and abandon their churches and crosses will be safe until they reach their place of safety…' (al-Tabarī 1997: (2) 449, El-ᶜAwaisī 2005: 73). This statement seems to strongly enhance the main reason why the Muslims conquered Islamicjerusalem. The establishment of *Amān* was their main aim, a far cry from any kind of aggression and revenge purposes. Indeed, *Amān* was crucially needed to resolve the long-lasting conflicts occurring in Islamicjerusalem between the world powers such as Roman and Persian during that time. It seems safe to accept that 'it would be difficult or even impossible to establish peace and stability' without *Amān* (El-ᶜAwaisī 2005: 76). By the same token, the researcher argues that this practice indicated that, after the Muslim conquest, Muslims had full sovereignty over every single inch of the conquered land. Thus, they were responsible for the safety of every single thing within its boundaries. They were obliged to make secure not only its people regardless of their beliefs, race and colours but also animals, plants and the environment.

In addition, the researcher argues that this statement shows the difference between sovereignty over the territory and sovereignty over the people. Indeed, the Muslims had sovereignty over Islamicjerusalem land giving them the authority to fully manage security affairs within the boundaries of the region. However, to execute their sovereignty over the people of Islamicjerusalem, they did not employ force or an aggressive approach. It seems that a subtle and tolerable approach was used as they gave options to the inhabitants of Islamicjerusalem, either to remain in the

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[2]    They were the Byzantines during that period.

region and pay *jizya* or to leave the region with the Byzantines. Therefore, the security duty undertaken by the Muslims to ensure the Byzantines and those who decided to follow them was due to the implementation of the Muslim concept of sovereignty over Islamicjerusalem land. This kind of understanding prompted them to ensure that no unjustifiable harm could occur within the boundaries of Islamicjerusalem that could affect the *Amān*, which had been promised in ᶜUmar's Assurance of Safety. In other words, once the departing individuals crossed the borders of Muslim territory of Islamicjerusalem, the security duties over them would no longer be the Muslim responsibility.

**The Role of Muslims in Securing Islamicjerusalem Territory**

Although, there is a clear document of ᶜUmar's Assurance of safety regarding Muslims' commitment to secure Islamicjerusalem, this can still be questioned; did words became translated into action? Therefore, the researcher attempts to examine the practical steps taken by Muslims towards implementing their security commitment ensured by the document as an integral part of the Muslim concept of sovereignty. The researcher found that Muslim sovereigns employed two major strategies to secure the region and its population from any attack from outside the territory as well as preventing any kind of internal aggressions. Khālid Ibn Miᶜdān (d. 103 AH/ 721 CE), ᶜUbāda Ibn Nusayy (d. 118 AH/ 736 CE), and Sayf Ibn ᶜUmar (d. 180 AH/ 796 CE) note:

> 'He (ᶜUmar) then sent to them (an army) and divided Jund Filastīn between two men; he put ᶜAlqama Ibn Hākim in charge of one half and stationed him in al-Ramla, and he put ᶜAlqama Ibn Mujazziz in charge of the other half and stationed him in al-Quds. Each of them stayed in his province with the soldiers who were with them' (al-Tabarī 1997: (2) 449).

The researcher found that they might possibly refer to the divisions within Jund Filastīn. However, the researcher argues that al-Ramla and al-Quds may not be the appropriate names. This is due to the fact that the former was only founded by Sulaymān Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik (96-99 AH/ 715-17 CE) in 96 AH/ 715 CE (al-Balādhurī 1983: 149). While, the name al-Quds did not appear until the Abbasid period. Thus, the researcher argues that they could possibly intend to refer to Ludd (Lydda) and the area of the City of Islamicjerusalem as the early military stations of Islamicjerusalem. It seems more acceptable since Lydda had been chosen as the administrative centre of Jund Filastīn from the first Muslim conquest up to the time of Sulaymān Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik (Ibn Jaʿfar 1981: 299, Abū al-Rubb 2002: 253). In addition, al-Tabarī (d. 310 AH/ 922 CE) (1997: (3) 608-610, Hamīdullāh 1987: 494) reports that there was an assurance which was given by ʿUmar for the people of Lydda and its jurisdictions. Hence, it seems reliable that Lydda was possibly chosen as one of the military stations following the first Muslim conquest and not al-Ramla.

With regard to the second place where ʿAlqama Ibn Mujazziz had been stationed, the researcher argues that it could possibly refer to the City of Islamicjerusalem (Aelia Capitolina)[3] since maybe it was considered as biggest and the most important part of the region. The city itself had long been the centre for pilgrimage and seemed busy with economic and social activities, which might have prompted the Muslim rulers to heighten the security measures there.

More interestingly, the researcher found that both stations for the military centres, namely Lydda and the City of Islamicjerusalem, were located within the boundaries

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[3] Aelia Capitolina is referred to as the City of Islamicjerusalem, while Aelia is referred to as the Islamicjerusalem region.

of Islamicjerusalem. Therefore, the researcher argues that ʿUmar as a Muslim ruler had shown his great concern to secure the conquered territories especially Islamicjerusalem by placing ʿAlqama Ibn Hākim and ʿAlqama Ibn Mujazziz as military and administrative governors there. From a logistic point of view, this can be seen as taking strategic and practical measures to securing the region. On the one hand, Lydda could effectively function to monitor security affairs for the coastal area of Islamicjerusalem. Strategically, it was not one of the coastal towns, which appeared vulnerable to Byzantine naval attacks and it was not too far to be connected to the coastal area of Islamicjerusalem. Hence, it could function as a controlling military centre as well as a defensive station. Whereas the City of Islamicjerusalem could serve the security needs of the inner or middle parts of the region. Its mountainous location would seem very strategic to control the security affairs of busy and populated places such as Nablus, Jericho, Hebron and the Walled City of Islamicjerusalem. Thus, in terms of security organisation, the researcher argues that the Muslim ruler provided the best possible measures to secure Islamicjerusalem during that time.

In addition, the great concern of the Muslim ruler, regarding security affairs of Islamicjerusalem can also be seen during ʿUmar's second visit to Islamicjerusalem after the ʿAmwās plague in 18 AH/ 639 CE. Although he did away with the positions of the governors of Jund Filastīn in his new administrative structure of Syria and appointed Yazīd Ibn Abī Sufyān governor of Jund Filastīn and the Mediterranean Coast, he kept ʿAlqama Ibn Mujazziz in his post as governor of Islamicjerusalem. Moreover, he appointed ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn ʿAlqama Ibn Mujazziz as governor of Islamicjerusalem in place of his father after ʿAlqama's death (al-Tel 2003: 257). One

could argue, if security of the region was given top priority, why should ᶜUmar revoke previous arrangements in order to place two military leaders in Islamicjerusalem? Here, the researcher argues that the new arrangement could show the importance of strategic measures in dealing with security affairs and optimising human resources. Therefore, such a decision was probably made due to the current conditions of the region, which seems to have been in a more conducive situation for change two years after the conquest. At the same time, there might have been more crucial needs for security purposes in other Muslim territories that prompted ᶜUmar to make a tactical decision in maintaining the strength of Muslim armies by brilliantly utilising available human resources. This seems reasonable as a significant number of Muslim forces including prominent Muslim leaders such as Abū ᶜUbayda and Shurahbil Ibn Hasana had died during the plague (al-Yaᶜqūbī (n.d.: (2) 150). Al-Yaᶜqūbī (d. 284 AH/ 897 CE) (n.d.: (2) 150) and Ibn ᶜAbd al-Bar (d. 463 AH/ 1070 CE) (1995: (2) 343) estimate that around 25,000 people died during that time. Accordingly, the new arrangements could be seen as a suitable tactical approach to addressing the situational needs and not to undermine the significance of the security affairs in Islamicjerusalem.

In order to secure the land of Islamicjerusalem, the Muslims also employed *al-ribāt* (watch-post) system in several significant military garrisons, which seemed effective in facing outside enemies. Since the Byzantines as their main rivals during that period had a strong naval army, Muslims had strategically emphasised the security of vulnerable spots along the coastal area. Therefore, they initiated the establishing of more military garrisons along that area such as Caesarea, Arsuf, Jaffa and Ascalon (Ibn Jaᶜfar 1981: 188, Abū al-Rubb 2002: 338). Muslim sovereigns since the time of

ᶜUmar had arranged permanent and temporary armed forces settlement in order to build up a strong defence and to utilise their manpower all around the Muslim territories, particularly in the newly conquered land. The researcher found this kind of arrangement to corroborate with Fātimatuzzahrā' ᶜAbd Rahmān's (2004: 63-64) argument that most of the early Muslim settlements in Islamicjerusalem were located along the garrison towns, especially along the coastal area. Interestingly, although the Muslim armed forces settled in the existing coastal towns, they did not put the local inhabitants under pressure by forcing them out or confiscating their land. Instead, the Muslim sovereign had allocated for them the uninhabited land that had been left by the Byzantines. This kind of land was also called *qatā'iᶜ* (granted lands) (al-Māwardī 2000: 208).

Hugh Kennedy claims that the Muslims were instructed to settle in garrison cities rather than be dispersed through the countryside for military control and to discourage them from becoming assimilated and losing their religious and ethnic identity (Kennedy 2001: 7). However, the researcher argues that Kennedy's assumption is unjustifiable with reference to Islamicjerusalem, as Muslim armies were settled in garrison towns alongside the local inhabitants without appropriating their land. In short, the Muslim sovereigns did allow them to socialise with the local inhabitants but not to confiscate even a single inch of owned land because they were responsible for the security of those people.

Although numbers of Muslim armies had been stationed in Ascalon and Caesarea since the time of ᶜUmar and ᶜUthmān (24-36 AH/ 644-656 CE), the Byzantines had destroyed the garrison and taken over the control of both cities during the conflict

between ᶜAbd al-Malik (65-85 AH/ 685-705 CE) and Ibn al-Zubayr. However, shortly afterwards, ᶜAbd al-Malik successfully secured both cities and started to rebuild their defence and facilities (al-Balādhurī 1983: 148). ᶜAbd al-Malik also stationed more forces there, which contained men from the Quraysh and Kināna tribes. Apparently, the military policy that focused on the garrison towns of Islamicjerusalem had been continuously practised from the first Muslim conqueror till the later period. The researcher argues that the Muslim concept of sovereignty had guided the Muslim sovereigns to take appropriate action in securing places in Islamicjerusalem. They also showed their best efforts in developing the cities as ᶜAbd al-Malik had done, towards ensuring a harmonious and safe life.

The researcher argues that the seriousness and commitment of Muslim sovereigns towards assuring the security of Islamicjerusalem can also be seen in the discipline of implementing the *al-ribāt* system. Accordingly, those who were required to be temporarily stationed at the garrisons had to complete one year's duty every four years. If they lived near the garrison towns, this military duty could be performed twice as they stayed for six months each, while those lived far from the garrisons were required to perform their duties once with a longer period of duty (a one-year stay) (al-Maqrizī 1970: (1) 172, Abū al-Rubb 2002: 339). Historical accounts such as quoted by al-Asbahānī (d. 430 AH/ 1038 CE) and Ibn ᶜAsākir (d. 539 AH/ 1144 CE) also mention some Muslim personalities in relation to Islamicjerusalem, played their roles in establishing the garrison towns surrounding the region. For instance, Shamᶜūn al-Azdī, a companion, used to be stationed at the coastal area (Ibn ᶜAsākir 1995: (23) 203) as well as Ibrāhīm al-Adham, who was temporarily stationed in Ascalon (al-Asbahānī 1967: (7) 383). Muslim forces in garrison towns were also subjected to

specific rules, for instance they were not allowed to leave the garrisons without permission from the commander. However, they still got their leave allowance during their duty to visit their family if the situation on the ground seemed calm and permissible enough to leave the station. This happened to Shamᶜūn, who one day got leave to visit his family in the Walled City of Islamicjerusalem during his duty at the garrison town. But his leave allowance ended without his having enough time to meet his family as he unintentionally spent much of his time earlier in the al-Aqṣā mosque praying and reciting the Qurān (Abū al-Rubb 2002: 340). This kind of strict discipline implemented in the garrisons had successfully prevented the forces from fleeing from their crucial posts. Hence, the researcher argues that the implementation of the Muslim concept of sovereignty in Islamicjerusalem indicates that very tight security measures were taken to defend the land.

Furthermore, Muslim forces in Islamicjerusalem were also involved in the battalions, which had been sent to challenge the Byzantine garrison towns during the winter and summer times, *al-shawāti'* and *al-sawāif*. *Al-sā'ifa* began on the tenth of July and went to the middle of September, when the forces returned to their own garrisons; while *al-shātia* took twenty days only, beginning at the end of February till the end of March (Ibn Jaᶜfar 1981: 193). This kind of campaigns had been initiated since the time of ᶜUmar as Muᶜāwiya had led an expedition in 23 AH/ 644 CE, accompanied by other companions based in Islamicjerusalem such as ᶜUbāda Ibn al-Sāmit and Shaddād Ibn Aws. They moved forward till they reached ᶜUmūriyya (al-Tabarī 1997: (2) 588). The researcher argues that these military initiatives pioneered by ᶜUmar himself showed their consciousness of protecting Islamicjerusalem from any threat by employing a preventive strategy; the Byzantines would not be able to launch an attack

as they would be concentrating on defending their garrisons. Due to its effectiveness, during the time of ʿUthmān, this military approach was carried out until the conflict between ʿAlī (35-41 AH/ 656-661 CE) and Muʿāwiya occurred, which prompted Muʿāwiya to make an agreement with the Byzantines for a ceasefire (Abū al-Rubb 2002: 341).

It is worth mentioning that most of the battalions sent in *al-shawātīʾ* and *al-sawāʾif* were led by the fighters from Islamicjerusalem such as Sufyān Ibn Awf al-Azdī, Mālik Ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Khathʿamī, al-Hārith Ibn Wahhāb al-Azdī and Janāda Ibn Abī Umayya al-Azdī (Ibn ʿAsākir 1995: (21) 44). The researcher argues that the appointment of these military commanders was not only due to their quality of leadership, but also because of their well-motivated spirit to secure their land of Islamicjerusalem. This seems justifiable as the Muslim sovereigns also assigned Muslim fighters originally from Islamicjerusalem to be actively involved in the naval expedition. Undoubtedly, their knowledge with regard to the situation in the coastal area and the Mediterranean Sea would have assisted the Muslim forces in using the most strategic military plan towards defeating the Byzantines even in a naval collision between them. Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī (d. 314 AH/ 926 CE) (1968: (1) 122) mentions some of the prominent figures who contributed much in strengthening Muslim naval people, such as Abū ʿUmāma al-Bāhilī, Shaddād Ibn Aws, ʿUbāda Ibn al-Sāmit and Tamīm Ibn Aws al-Dārī (Ibn ʿAsākir 1995: (11) 62).

In addition, the researcher argues that Muslim sovereigns had allocated a huge amount of money for security purposes. This was due to the fact that Muslim forces, which were responsible for defending the frontiers of the region, were equipped with

good military equipment and were well prepared. Ibn ᶜAsākir (1995: (21) 351) quotes from Sufyān Ibn ᶜAwf al-Azdī, one of the *al-sawāfī* leaders during Muᶜāwiya's time that he had instructed Muslim fighters to prepare themselves with horses and arrows. Accordingly, some of the forces originally from Hijāz initiated the renting of horses as their main preparation to perform their duties in Ascalon (Mālik Ibn Anas n.d: (2) 44). It seems to the researcher that this kind of preparation incurred a lot of expense and most of the fighters did not come from wealthy backgrounds and some were even from the rural areas and villages. Hence, due to their understanding of the Muslim concept of sovereignty, Muslim sovereigns allocated to each fighter an adequate salary before going to perform their military duties. In order to ensure everything went smoothly and the armed forces were treated fairly, ᶜUmar had initiated the forming of *diwān al-ᶜatāᶜ* (office of wages), responsible for arranging their salaries and benefits.

The formation of *diwān al-ᶜatāᶜ* indicates that Muslim sovereigns paid strong attention towards maintaining the motivation of their armies by allocating them reasonable rewards, so that they could perform their duties at the highest possible standard. Moreover, this attention was not only given to the armies, but also to the horses and camels, which were used for military purposes; they were allocated sufficient food and drink and the fighters were responsible for keeping their horses in good condition. It is mentioned by al-Asbahānī (1967: (5) 144) that ᶜAbd Allāh Ibn Muhayriz brought along with him some food for his horse when he went out to face the Byzantines. A huge amount of money was also allocated to prepare military equipment such as heavy weapons (Abū al-Rubb 2002: 358). Indeed, this kind of

approach affirms the significance of security as one of the top priorities of the sovereign.

**Securing the Region: The Role of the Non-Muslim Inhabitants of Islamicjerusalem**

'The people of Aelia must pay the *jizya* (tax) like the people of the (other) cities, and they must expel the Byzantines and the robbers…' (al-Tabarī 1997: (2) 449, El-ᶜAwaisī 2005: 73). Based on this condition, the researcher argues that the Muslim sovereign gave clear conditions to the non-Muslim inhabitants to emphasize their commitment and togetherness in keeping the security of their shared land by not having any alliance with their enemies. In order to instil a deep feeling of responsibility, they were required to pay the *jizya*. Hence, the researcher argues that the payment of *jizya* was not a matter of amount that could be collected, rather a mechanism to enhance the commitment and responsibility to keep everything within the territory in the best possible condition with full warranty of security.

The sovereignty over the Islamicjerusalem region established the duties and responsibilities of the sovereign to secure the safety of everyone who lived within the specified boundaries. Therefore, *jizya* was a charge made to the non-Muslims for the safety and security provided for their life, property and honour by the Muslim authority (al-Butī 1999: 8). The researcher argues that the non-Muslim inhabitants of Islamicjerusalem also played their role in protecting the region from harm and aggression. Although almost all the sources highlight their status as that of a protected minority, who were subjected to pay *jizya* for their security, the researcher argues that the payment of *jizya* shows that the non-Muslims of Islamicjerusalem also

contributed to keeping the region in safety. This is due to the fact that the collection of *jizya* was allocated for security purposes.

Interestingly, while most of the non-Muslim inhabitants performed their duties for security purposes implicitly, some of them performed their duties explicitly. Al-Balādhurī (d. 279 AH/ 892 CE) (1983: 162) reports on the authority of Hishām Ibn ᶜAmmār Ibn Muslim from Safwān Ibn ᶜAmr, that 'Abū ᶜUbayda Ibn al-Jarrāh had made *sulh* (peace) with Samaritans in *Urdun* and *Filastīn*.' Al-Balādhurī elaborates that this Assurance had been given due to their important roles in helping the Muslims army. It has been reported that they became the spies and guides for the Muslims during the battle (al-Balādhurī 1983: 162).

However, Palmer (1993: 146) quotes from one of the West-Syrian Chronicles extracted from *Chronicon anonynum ad Annum Christi 1234 pertinens* (The Anonymous Chronicle of 1234 CE/ 631 AH). In text no. 49 it says:

> 'The opposite number of the general sent to Palestine was the porticos Sergius, to whom Heraclius had committed Palestinian Caesarea and its region. When he learned of the Arab army's approach he assembled his own forces and sent 5,000 Samaritan foot-soldiers to strengthen his army in the coming encounter with the Arabs…' (Palmer 1993: 146)

This clearly indicates that the Samaritans had joined the Byzantines to fight against the Muslim armies.

Nevertheless, the researcher found that al-Balādhurī's account seems more reliable as it is strengthened by the fact that they had been given special treatment, an exemption from *kharāj* (al-Balādhurī 1983: 162). El-ᶜAwaisī (2005: 90) argues that the Assurance for the Samaritans could be considered as the second Assurance of safety

to the Jewish people of Aelia particularly to those living in the northern part of Islamicjerusalem, especially in Nablus. This seems acceptable as Armstrong (1997: 209) notes that their holy place is thought to be in Mount Gerizim which is located in Nablus. On the other hand, the researcher is inclined to reject Palmer's argument because the anonymous status of the West-Syrian Chronicles itself could weaken the reliability of the argument. Moreover, this also has not been supported by other reliable sources.

One could argue that if the Samaritans' contribution in assisting the Muslims was valued, why they still needed to pay *jizya* as mentioned by al-Balādhurī (1983: 162). It seems more acceptable that they be exempted from *jizya* instead of *kharāj* due to their direct contribution in security matters. The researcher has found some reasons why the Samaritans were given exemption from *kharāj* and not from *jizya*. Firstly, the researcher argues that, the involvement of the Samaritans with the Muslim forces was reported before the conquest, when the Muslims did not yet have sovereignty over them or even over the land. Therefore, it seems impossible for the Muslims to give them exemption from *jizya*. Secondly, their involvement could be considered as other groups of local people's involvement with any parties during the battles. In other words, they joined Muslim armies as a support group on a temporary basis since they were not appointed and recorded within the list of Muslim forces. Also, no account mentions that they were involved in Muslim armies after the conquest, either in Islamicjerusalem or even in other Muslim territories. Thirdly, the exemption from *jizya* should be based on a valid reason such as disability, old age or being a child or a woman. Since they were probably not included in any of those groups, they were not eligible for exemption. However, their contribution in helping Muslim armies was not

neglected. The Muslim ruler, namely Abū ʿUbayda gave them exemption from *kharāj* on their private land.

In addition, the non-Muslim inhabitants of Islamicjerusalem had also been given exemption from *jizya* due to their service to the Muslim government. According to Ibn al-Murajjā (d.442 AH/ 1050 CE) (1995: 62, al-Tel 2003: 237-238), there were Jews among the servants of al-Aqsā Mosque during the time of ʿAbd al-Malik Ibn Marwān (65-85 AH/ 685-705 CE), who were not subject to the *jizya*. Although they were not directly involved in the battlefield, the researcher argues that the post that they were going to fulfil was also related to security matters since being the servants of al-Aqsā Mosque they had full responsibility for upholding the security of the area. This seems reasonable because al-Aqsā Mosque had become central attraction in Islamicjerusalem, always busy with visitors and pilgrims. This situation really needs more attention with regard to its security matters.

Interestingly, El-ʿAwaisi (2005: 76) argues that the obligatory *jizya* payment by the non-Muslims was purposely introduced to establish a two-way traffic relationship between them and the Muslims. He says, 'On one hand, to encourage the sense of belonging and the feeling that they were an integral part of the society through being involved in contributing financially to the welfare and development in their region; and on the other hand, as a means to commit them to the state' (El-ʿAwaisi 2005: 76). The researcher agrees with him since the security of Islamicjerusalem territory could not be ensured without the participation of the local inhabitants of the region. The researcher argues that the *jizya* payment among the non-Muslims was possibly becoming an important factor in assisting the Muslim sovereigns to maintain a

peaceful environment. Mutual commitment and a sense of belonging seem to have effectively avoided any rebellion from the local inhabitants of Islamicjerusalem. This kind of responsibility made the non-Muslims contributing partners in maintaining the security of the region. Mutual understanding and a partnership feeling were really crucial to secure the region internally and externally.

**Conclusion**

The researcher found that Muslim sovereigns showed a deep understanding towards implementing the Muslim concept of sovereignty in Islamicjerusalem in the early Muslim period. It seems clear, referring to the security measures that had been taken throughout the whole region, that Islamicjerusalem might even be considered as being among the most strategic locations in Muslim territories regarding security organization.

Although almost all the armed forces in Islamicjerusalem were Muslim, the sovereigns did not neglect the importance of non-Muslim inhabitants' contribution in maintaining the security of the region. The researcher found that the *jizya* payment among the non-Muslims was one of the factors that assisted the Muslim sovereigns to avoid rebellion from the local inhabitants in Islamicjerusalem as it successfully instilled in them sense of belonging and a responsibility toward securing their territory.

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